TRIPS is unique in these anti-intellectual property agreements because WTO membership is a „package agreement,“ meaning that WTO members are not free to choose between agreements. They are governed by all multilateral WTO agreements, including trips. Reading these strategic objectives, it is fair to say that WIPO`s efforts are all focused on promoting a global ip culture, but also on balanced international intellectual property laws, which should meet emerging needs and be flexible enough to fit within each country`s superior policy objectives. According to trips, the industrialized countries should have fully implemented the agreement by 1 January 1996. Members of developing countries and members in transition to a market economy were allowed to delay the full implementation of TRIPS commitments until 1 January 2000. The least developed members had until January 1, 2006 to meet their obligations, with the possibility of a new transition on demand. Developing countries, which, at the time of filing, did not grant patent protection for certain technology sectors, were given a new five-year period, until 1 January 2005, to guarantee such protection. In November 2005, the 2006 transition period for least developed countries was extended until 1 July 2013. This clause is an acute tactical mechanism to ensure the objectives of the global ip ratchet, which is in fact aimed at gradually imposing the highest level of intellectual property protection on the world. Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti argue that the importance of TRIPS in the process of developing and disseminating knowledge and innovation has been overestimated by its supporters.
This was supported by the FINDINGs of the United Nations that many low-protection countries regularly benefit from significant foreign direct investment (FDI).  Analysis of OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (which extended the lifespan of drug patents by 6 years) showed that, although the total number of registered products increased slightly, the average innovation index remained unchanged.  On the other hand, J-rg Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser (2017) find historical evidence that compulsory licensing – a key mechanism for weakening IP rights under Article 31 of TRIPS – can effectively lead to the promotion of inventions by increasing the threat to competition in areas of low competition.